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Performance of Personal Pension Schemes in the UK 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the performance of personal pensions (exempt unit trusts) in 
the UK 1980-2000. Unitised personal pension schemes are a type of mutual fund 
that is constituted as a contractual savings scheme, whose value can only be 
accessed at retirement. By studying the performance of these schemes we are able 
to assess the role of illiquidity in retail savings products. The paper examines 
those personal pension schemes that invest predominantly in UK equities, and 
first reports on the growth in personal pension schemes over this twenty-year 
period. The paper then assesses the performance of these pension funds relative to 
various asset pricing benchmarks, including a four factor benchmark that allows 
for momentum in stock returns, and allowing for market timing and conditioning 
on macroeconomic variables, and finds that average performance is not 
significantly different from zero. The paper goes on to examine persistence in 
performance of these pension schemes and identifies negative persistence at short 
horizons, but at time-intervals of six months to one year finds significant positive 
persistence, though this positive persistence weakens at longer time intervals. 
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I   Introduction 
There has been a substantial growth in UK personal pensions over the last twenty 
years. According to the Sandler Report (2002) between 1988 and 1995 the share of 
total pensions assets represented by personal pensions increased from 12 to over 20 
per cent. Personal pension schemes are funded and pay a pension at retirement on a 
defined contribution basis, and are broadly similar to the US’s 401k individual 
pension plans, in that individuals have some choice over the type of investments in 
the fund, but the investment vehicle is a pooled investment fund, in which the 
individual participates with many other individuals. As a funded scheme, individuals 
make contributions into a personal pension fund over time, and this fund is managed 
and invested by a financial institution. Our aim in this paper is to examine the 
performance of these managed contractual savings schemes. 
 
In the case of personal pensions, the financial institutions managing the portfolios are 
typically insurance companies, though they may in turn employ external fund 
managers. We will examine the performance of unit-linked personal pensions 
managed by these financial institutions as pooled investment funds. Unit-linked 
exempt schemes are a specific type of mutual fund where contributions to personal 
pensions are set up as a contractual savings scheme.1 These contractual savings 
schemes are a very illiquid form of investment, since the cumulated funds can only be 
accessed at retirement,2 and we are interested in investigating the role of this 
illiquidity, in terms of fund performance. Recently Blake and Timmerman (1998), 
Allen and Tan (1999), Fletcher and Forbes (2002), and Giles, Wilson and Worboys 
(2002) have all investigated performance persistence in UK mutual funds (unit trusts) 
over the last two decades. Typically these papers have found some evidence of 
performance persistence, but that it tends to be caused by poor performers continuing 
to under-perform. We will be concerned to compare the performance of the unit-
linked personal pensions with the performance of mutual funds in general, to study 
the importance of long-term contractual savings on fund performance. 
                                                          
1 Personal pensions funds also benefits from tax-privileged status, so that no tax is paid on reinvested 
dividends or capital gains. In comparison standard unit trusts, in common with all corporate entities, do not 
pay tax on dividends received, nor since the Finance Act 1980 do authorised unit trusts pay tax on capital 
gains. So the returns on exempt unit trusts and authorised unit trusts are not affected by the tax system. 
2 In fact, savings in a personal pension are made even more illiquid, by an Inland Revenue rule that 75% of 
the value of the accumulated pension fund at retirement must be converted into an annuity. 
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II Personal pension schemes in the UK 
Personal Pensions were introduced in the UK in the Finance Act 1987, and came into 
existence on 1st July 1988. Prior to that date similar schemes called “Retirement 
Annuity Contracts”, had existed directed towards the self-employed.   The innovation 
of the 1987 pension legislation was the introduction of a specific type of personal 
pension known as an “appropriate personal pension”, which enabled an individual 
employee to contract out of the state scheme SERPS, so that the Department of Social 
Security pays a rebate of National Insurance contributions into the individual’s 
personal pension. Appropriate personal pensions are not available to the self-
employed, because they are excluded from SERPS, and therefore they are allowed to 
contribute into ordinary personal pensions, which are open to both the employed and 
self-employed. 
 
There are two types of investment vehicles which individuals may choose from at the 
outset of the contract when setting up a personal pension. Endowment Schemes may 
be either with-profits (typically with reversionary bonuses, which once announced 
cannot be withdrawn, and terminal bonuses) or non-profit options (though these may 
be guaranteed). The structure of with-profits policies means that investment returns 
are smoothed over time by the provider. In contrast, under the second type of 
investment vehicle, unit-linked schemes, contributions are used to buy units whose 
value is linked to a specific investment fund, and the value of the pension fund will 
rise or fall in line with the value of the underlying investments.3  In this paper it is the 
performance of this second type of investment vehicle that we examine. 
 
Under any defined contribution (or money purchase) scheme, individuals pay 
contributions into a fund, which builds up over time and at retirement the value of the 
fund is converted into an annuity to provide the pension. The pensioner bears the risk 
of fund underperformance, and is also exposed to the risk of converting the fund into 
an annuity at retirement.4  Contributions into these personal pension schemes are 
                                                          
3 A third type of investment vehicle is a Deposit Administration Scheme which is similar to a bank account, 
where the interest on the fund is reinvested, so that the capital value of the fund cannot fall. 
4 The 1995 Pensions Act allows a pensioner to defer the conversion of the fund into an annuity, and in the 
meantime “draw-down” the fund to provide an income 
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subject to tax relief, following approval by the Inland Revenue Pension Schemes 
Office. Personal pensions are open to both the self-employed and employees whose 
employer’s occupational scheme is not available, though employers often do not 
contribute to personal pensions. Benefits that a personal pension may pay to a 
pensioner are a pension (compulsory purchase annuity), to be started between the ages 
50-74, and a tax-free lump sum of up to 25% of the value of the pension fund. The 
value of the protected rights (the amount equivalent to SERPS) may not be taken out 
until normal retirement age. 
 
The percentage of the working population in the UK covered by each of the second 
and third tier schemes [James (1997)] is given in Table 1. According to the 
government Green Paper Partnership in Pensions (1998) there were 10 million 
personal pensions held, with 5.6 million APPs, and 4.6 million ordinary personal 
pensions, though some persons will have more than one pension. Individuals in the 
UK have been able to save in an individual pension plan through an exempt unit trust 
for a number of years. Table 2 reports the growth in the number of personal pension 
unit trusts from the Micropal database used in the current study. According to 
Pensions World (1976), in 1976 there were 24 authorised exempt unit trusts in 
existence with a combined market value of £71 million. From Table 2 it can be seen 
that by 2000 there were 545 funds investing in UK securities with a total market value 
£52.7 billion. Sandler (2002) suggests that there are three factors behind the growth in 
Personal Pensions. First there has been an increase in self-employment over the same 
period; second, the Social Security Act 1986 encouraged individual employees to opt 
out of SERPS and occupational schemes into a funded personal pension schemes; and 
third, the more recent introduction in April 2001 of Stakeholder Pensions. According 
to the OFT Report (1997) “The take up of approved personal pensions was much 
more rapid than expected. Between their introduction in 1988 and April 1993, the 
number of employees with personal pensions reached 5.7 million” (p. 32). Tables 3 
illustrates the take-up of personal pensions throughout the nineties, and reports the 
numbers of employees who are members of personal pensions operated by insurance 
companies. Panel A shows the total numbers of policies outstanding at the end of each 
year and Panel B shows the number of new policies taken out in each year. Insurance 
companies distinguish between regular monthly (referred to as regular premiums) and 
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premiums payable as a lump sum (referred to as single premiums). It appears from 
Panel A that there are more than 20 million personal pensions outstanding by the end 
of 1999. However, it can be seen that the average premium per policy in Panel A of 
personal pensions in force was only £335 in 1999. In contrast the average premium of 
a new policy was over £15,350 in the case of single one-off contributions and over 
£1,353 in the case of yearly regular contribution schemes. The low contributions rate 
for personal pensions is a cause for concern since these rates are about one percent of 
average earnings and are unlikely to build up to a fund value which would generate a 
pension to live off.  The discrepancy between the premiums for outstanding and new 
schemes highlights the fact that a large percentage of personal pensions are 
terminated before maturity due to the cessation of contributions. In the event that a 
contributor stops paying into the personal pension, the pension scheme is converted to 
paid-up status, which typically has low maturity values because the plan provider 
continues to extract the same annual charges as with an active policy.  
 
The UK financial markets regulator (now the Financial Services Authority) has been 
reporting the (contributions) persistency of personal pensions using surveys since 
1993/94.5 Smith (2004) reports on these contribution persistency rates up to 2001, and 
these figures are reproduced in Table 4.  Contribution persistency rates vary across 
distribution channels, depending on whether the pension is sold through an agent tied 
to a particular financial institution, or through an independent financial advisor, but 
there is evidence of convergence between the rates from these different distribution 
channels. There was a trend towards improvements in contribution persistency rates 
in the mid-nineties, which has since been reversed. The FSA (2000) reports on why 
consumers stop contributing into long-run savings policies. In a survey of 400 
“lapsers” the study found that 10 per cent were genuinely unpredictable; in 25 per 
cent of cases the reason for lapsing was to do with the product (poor performance; 
disappointment with or sale; or feeling product was not right). In 60 per cent of cases 
lapse occurred because product became unaffordable, and in one third of these cases 
                                                          
5 Rather confusingly, persistency is used in two different contexts. Persistency in the performance of a fund, 
and persistency in consumers continuing to contribute to the contractual savings schemes. We will 
subsequently refer to this second type of persistency as contributions persistency. 
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the discontinuation could have been predicted.6 The econometric evidence in Smith 
(2004) confirms these findings, and reports some evidence of a link between stock 
market performance and contribution persistence. She makes the point that it is not in 
the interests of either consumers or the financial services industry, for consumers to 
let these contractual savings schemes lapse. From the consumers’ perspective, this is 
because of the costs that they incur [Chapman (1999)]; but also providers lose out 
from the reduced revenue of a static fund and a loss of goodwill/reputation. 
Consequently we might expect unitised personal pension fund providers to devote 
greater resources to ensuring the personal pension funds are managed more 
effectively than regular unit trusts. Equally consumers, before they enter a contractual 
scheme, might be expected to examine the past performance of the pension fund 
provider.  
 
III Evidence on Performance of Managed Funds 
Unit-linked personal pensions are a type of mutual fund. The early literature of the 
performance of mutual funds in the US [Jensen (1968)] and much of the subsequent 
literature found that simple tests of abnormal performance did not yield significant 
returns. More recent work by Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997) using 
normal portfolio analysis shows that mutual fund managers – in particular aggressive-
growth funds, exhibit some selectivity ability but that funds exhibit no timing ability. 
They introduce measures that identify whether a manager can time the market, size, 
book to market, or momentum strategies. For the UK Blake and Timmermann (1998) 
examine the returns on 2300 UK open ended unit trusts over 23 year period (1972- 
1995) gross of fees. Over the period the data includes 973 dead and 1402 surviving 
funds, and by studying the termination of funds, they are able to shed light on the 
extent of survivorship bias. They find economically and statistically very significant 
underperformance that intensifies as the termination date approaches, and they 
conclude that survivorship does not alter the results significantly.  
 
Ippolito and Turner (1987), Coggin, Fabozzi and Rahman (1993), Lakonishok, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) provide evidence on the performance of occupational 
                                                          
6 Alfon (20002) reports ABI figures that show that less than 1% of consumers switch to another pension 
provider. 
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pension funds relative to external benchmarks, but this has also been disappointing. 
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) emphasise that although there is a long 
literature on the under-performance of mutual funds, pension funds also under-
perform relative to mutual funds on average: they refer to a “double-agency” problem 
since trustees of occupational pension funds also employ fund managers. In the UK 
Blake, Lehmann, and Timmermann, (1999) examine the asset allocations of a sample 
of 364 UK occupational pension funds who retained the same fund manager over the 
period 1986-1994. They find that the total return is dominated by asset allocation. 
Average return from stock selection is negative, and average return to market timing 
very negative. Thomas and Tonks (2001) in a large sample of pension funds find little 
evidence of any abnormal performance, but find that pension funds seem to follow 
very similar investment strategies, so that identifying out-performance is difficult. 
 
Although on average fund managers do not outperform, in any sample there is a 
distribution to the performance, and more recently research on performance 
measurement has investigated consistency in performance, and whether there is 
persistence among the out-performers in the sample. Grinblatt and Titman (1992) find 
that differences in mutual fund performance between funds persist over 5-year time 
horizons and this persistence is consistent with the ability of fund managers to earn 
abnormal returns. Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993) analysed the short-term 
relative performance of no-load, growth orientated mutual funds, and found the 
strongest evidence for persistence in a one year evaluation horizon. Brown and 
Goetzmann (1995) examine the performance persistence of US mutual funds and 
claim that the persistence is mostly due to funds that lag the S&P.  They demonstrate 
that relative performance pattern depends 
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the existence of skilled or informed mutual fund portfolio managers. Blake and 
Timmerman (1998), Allen and Tan (1999), Fletcher and Forbes (2002), Giles, Wilson 
and Worboys (2002) have all investigated performance persistence in UK mutual 
funds (unit trusts) over the last two decades, with conflicting results. Blake and 
Timmermann (1998), Allen and Tan (1999) and Giles et al (2002) all find evidence of 
persistence in performance, but Fletcher and Forbes (2002) report that the evidence of 
persistence can be explained by a momentum factor. To the extent that there is 
persistence, it tends to be explained by the persistently poor performance of some 
underperforming funds. The Financial Services Authority (1999) discusses the use of 
past performance figures by unit trusts. 
 
In the UK Brown, Draper and McKenzie (1997) and Blake, Lehmann, & 
Timmermann, (1999) have examined consistency in UK occupational pension fund 
performance. Both studies find only weak evidence of persistence in performance. In 
constructing their data samples, both the Brown et al (1997) and Blake et al (1999) 
studies of UK pension funds specify that the pension fund have the same single fund 
manager over the length of their respective samples. Tonks (2002) argues that this 
specification of the dataset may have induced survivorship bias in these data samples, 
since Grinblatt and Titman (1992) and Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993) have 
argued that if fund survival depends on average performance over several periods, 
then survivorship induces spurious reversals: first-period losers must subsequently 
win in order to survive, and this biases persistence downwards. Tonks (2002) 
examines persistence in pension fund manager performance using data on UK 
occupational pension funds irrespective of whether they change manager. He finds 
strong evidence of persistence in abnormal returns generated by fund managers over 
one year time horizons. He then compares his sample with a restricted sample that 
imposes the Brown et al (1997), and Blake et al (1999) criteria that specify that the 
pension fund has the same fund manager over the length of their respective samples. 
With the restricted sample the evidence on persistence is weaker. 
 
 
III Measuring Fund Performance  
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Using Jensen’s technique we regress the excess returns above the risk free rate  RFPt - 
rft  against a four factor model. The four factor model is represented by the standard 
Fama-French three factors, that are the excess return on the market Rmt - rft,  the 
returns on a size factor  SMBt  which is the difference between the returns on a 
portfolio of small companies and a portfolio of large companies, and a book-to-
market factor HMLt which is the difference in returns on a portfolio of high book-to-
market companies and low book-to-market companies. The fourth factor is a 
momentum factor MOMt 
 
( )                         +  pitp1 ελδγβα +++−+=− MOMHMLSMBRRRR tptpftmtppftpt (1) 
 
We estimate this model for each fund p over the t data periods, and save the 
coefficients αp , βp, δp, γp and λp. Under the null hypothesis of no-abnormal 
performance the αp coefficient should be equal to zero. For each fund we may test the 
significance of αp as a measure of that funds abnormal performance. We may test for 
overall fund performance, by testing the significance of the mean α when there are N 
funds in the sample  
∑
=
− =
N
p
pN 1
1 αα   (2) 
Assuming that the performance of each fund is independent [Cov(Rp, Rq) = 0], the 
appropriate t-statistic is 
t
N SE
p
pp
N
=
=
∑1
1
α
α( )   (3) 
 
Alternatively, in estimating equation (1) without making any assumption about the 
cross-section relationship of returns between funds, we follow Blake and 
Timmermann (1998) and regress an equally-weighted portfolio of excess returns on 
the schemes for each time period t on the four factors.  
 
The original Jensen technique made no allowance for market timing abilities of fund 
managers when fund managers take an aggressive position in a bull market, but a 
defensive position in a bear market. When portfolio managers expect the market 
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portfolio to rise in value, they may switch from bonds into equities and/or they may 
invest in more high beta stocks. When they expect the market to fall they will 
undertake the reverse strategy: sell high beta stocks and move into “defensive” stocks. 
 
If managers successfully engage in market timing then, returns to the fund will be 
high when the market is high, and also relatively high when the market is low. The 
Treynor-Mazuy test for market timing imposes a quadratic term in the return 
regression to identify this curvature.  
 
Rpt - rf =αp+βp(Rmt -rf)+γpSMBt+δpHMLt+λpMOMt +ηp(Rmt - rf)2+εpt (4) 
 
Significance of market timing is measured by ηp.  Recently Ferson and Schadt (1996) 
advocate allowing for the benchmark parameters to be conditioned on economic 
variables resulting in a so-called “conditional performance evaluation”. Thebasis is 
that some market timing skills may be incorrectly credited to fund managers when in 
fact they are using publicly available information to determine future market 
movements. In such a case Ferson and Schadt argue that the predictable component of 
market movements should be removed in order to assess fund managers private 
market timing skills. Under a conditional version of the CAPM, the Jensen regression 
becomes 
 
( ) [ ]( )                           + it110 εββα ftmttpftmtppftpt RRzRRRR −′+−+=− −   (5) 
 
where zt-1 is a vector of instruments for the information available at time t (and is 
therefore specified as t-1)  and βi(zt) are time conditional betas, and their functional 
form is specified as linear 
 
βi(zt) = b0 + B’zt-1  (6) 
 
where zt-1 = Zt-1 - E(Z) is a vector of deviations of the Zs from their unconditional 
means. Implementing this approach involves creating interaction terms between the 
market returns and the instruments. Instruments used are: the lagged treasury bill rate, 
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the lagged dividend yield, the slope of the term structure (difference between long and 
short run government bond yields), and a dummy variable for January. 
 
The associated test for market timing now isolates the effect of public information 
incorporated in the conditional beta in (5). The amended Treynor-Mazuy  test is 
 
Rpt - rf  = αp +  bp(Rmt -rf)  + B’zt-1(Rmt - rf ) +  ηp(Rmt - rf)2  +  εpt (7) 
 
where the sensitivity of the manager’s beta to the private market timing signal is 
measured by ηp. 
 
In addition to testing for evidence of fund out-performance, we also examine the 
consistency or persistence of fund performance. Recently Carpenter and Lynch (1999) 
have assessed the power of these difference persistence tests particularly in the 
presence of different types of survivorship bias. Carpenter and Lynch classify 
persistence tests into two types: performance ranked portfolio strategies, and 
contingency tables.  
 
Performance ranked portfolio tests sort funds each year into portfolios based on past 
abnormal performance. The measure that we use of fund performance is the average 
abnormal returns on the funds under management, where the abnormal returns from 
equation (1) are averaged over each fund and over each quarter in the ranking period. 
We then compute the equally weighted average portfolio abnormal return of the top 
and bottom portfolios over the subsequent evaluation period. We report the average 
abnormal returns AV5 and AV1 of the top and bottom portfolios in the evaluation 
period, averaged over all time periods. These procedures are followed for overlapping 
periods throughout the full period of the dataset, and we compute DIF as AV5-AV1, 
and then report TDIF, which is a t-statistic on DIF, which is calculated after allowing 
for the autocorrelation induced by the overlapping observations. From their 
simulations Carpenter and Lynch find that the persistence test based on TDIF is the 
best specified under the hypothesis of no persistence, and the most powerful against 
the alternatives considered. 
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In these persistence tests we examine alternative ranking and evaluation time periods, 
since it may be the case that persistence is only apparent at particular time intervals. 
For example to test for long run persistence 36MR36ME means we form portfolios on 
the basis of three-year ranking period and three year evaluation period.  To test for 
short-run persistence, or the "hot-hands" phenomenon, we examine 1MR1ME, which 
means one month ranking and one month evaluation period. 
 
Contingency tables classify funds as winners or losers in each of two consecutive time 
periods, and the numbers of winner-winner (WW), winner-loser (WL), loser-winner 
(LW), and loser-loser (LL) combinations are counted. We compute the following 
related statistics: a) Cross-product ratio CP = (WW x LL)/(WL x LW); b) Chi-
Squared test with 1 d.o.f. where CHI = {(WW - N/4)2 + (WL - N/4)2  + (LW - N/4)2 
(LL - N/4)2}/N/4; c) Percentage of repeat winners, PRW = WW/(N/2); and d) TCS is 
the t-statistic for the slope coefficient in the cross-section OLS regression of 
evaluation period alphas on ranking period alphas. We may reject independence if 
CHI exceeds the critical value of 3.84 for a 5% test. 
 
IV Data  
The data used in this study has been obtained from Micropal, and consists of monthly 
returns on 506 exempt unit trusts which invest in UK equity portfolios from June 
1980 to December 2000, a total of 247 months.  Unlike unit trust data, Micropal 
continues to list prices for closed personal pension funds. 
 
Tables 5 provides some descriptive statistics on the returns to, and the size of, the 
unitised personal pensions in our dataset. From Panel A, the average discrete 
quarterly return over all unitised schemes over all months is 1.11%, compared with an 
average discrete return of 1.49% for the FT-All Share Index. The overall standard 
deviation of these returns is 4.57%, and the distribution of returns also emphasises 
that there is some variability in these returns. But this pooled measure disguises an 
important statistic that that the between schemes standard deviation (0.97%) is much 
less than the within scheme distribution (5.95%). This implies that for a particular 
month the distribution of returns is tightly packed around the mean, but that over time 
the variability of returns is much higher. 
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Table 5 Panel A also report on the distribution of returns weighted by the value of the 
unit trust at the end of the dataset7. The value weighted average return of 1.25% is 
consistent with larger unit trusts have a higher return than smaller unit trusts, but 
given we use end of period values in the value weighting this result could also be due 
to “success” bias (i.e. successful funds will grow at a faster rate than unsuccessful 
one, so ceteris paribus will be larger). In the subsequent regression analysis, we 
require a minimum number of observations to undertake a meaningful statistical 
analysis, and we imposed the requirement that time series fund parameters are only 
estimated when there were 20 or more monthly returns for that unit trust. Table 5 
Panel A reports the distribution of returns of the sub-sample of 399 unit trusts with at 
least 20 time series observations, and this may be compared with the distribution of 
returns across the whole sample, to check that the sub-sample is indeed 
representative. Similarly Panel A also reports the distribution of returns of those 20 
unit trusts that remained in existence over all 247 months in our dataset.  
 
Table 5, Panel B illustrates the Distribution of fund quarters over the dataset, and 
shows that 50 per cent funds have 152 or less monthly observations, and the average 
life of a fund in the data is just less than twelve years. As we have mentioned earlier 
there has been a tremendous growth in funds flowing into personal pensions, and this 
is in part represented by the number and type of funds in existence. In Panel C we 
report the characteristics of four different UK based personal pension funds: All UK 
Companies, Managed, Equity Income and Small. The returns on each of these types 
of personal pensions appear similar, though the small firm sector experienced poor 
returns in the first half of the sample and much larger returns throughout the ‘nineties. 
The number of funds in each category has increased by the second half of the sample, 
and the UK All Companies sector is by far the most popular. 
 
Panel D of Table 5 shows that the distribution of scheme size is skewed: with the 
median fund value in 2000 being 8 million pounds, but the mean value is 106 million 
pounds. It can be seen that ten per cent of the funds have values over 220 million 
pounds. 
                                                          
7 Micropal only reports the latest fund value each month 
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V Results 
We now turn to assessing the performance of these personal pension schemes over the 
period 1980-2000. Table 6 reports the results of estimating the average Jensen-alpha 
for alternative factor model benchmarks. The first row reports an average alpha value 
for the single factor model of -0.013% per month excess return obtained from 
estimating equation (1) for each of the 399 schemes imposing the restriction that  γp = 
δp = λp = 0. In the α-column of the table we report the average Jensen-alpha estimates 
from these regressions, and in the next column the overall t-statistic for the average 
value of each parameter, computed from equation (3).  The next two rows report for 
the single-factor model the addition of a market timing term in the unconditional 
(equation (4)) and conditional models (equation (7)). In general the addition of the 
market timing term increases the value of the alpha, but identifies a negative market 
timing effect. For the 3-factor model λp = 0, and the average alpha is 0.029% 
although this is significantly negative at the 10% level8. The addition of the market 
timing terms again identifies negative timing abilities, but increase the value of the 
selectivity component.  
 
For the four factor model the regression equation is the unrestricted version of (1), 
and the average alpha is 0.016% per month but significantly negative. The average 
market timing parameter from the Treynor regression in equation (4) and from the 
conditional model in equation (5) are reported in the η-column with its relevant t-
statistic in the adjacent column. It can be seen that the addition of the market timing 
term in both the conditional and unconditional models decomposes the abnormal 
performance into an insignificant positive selectivity but negative timing abilities, 
which become insignificantly negative under the conditional model. 
 
Table 7 reports the results of estimating abnormal performance of personal pension 
schemes following Blake and Timmermann (1998) and uses the portfolio excess 
return on all unit trusts. The first column reports the loadings on each of the four 
factors for the portfolio excess return. The loadings on the market portfolio and the 
                                                          
8 Note that the test statistic from (3) is weighted by 1/standard error.  Thus the mean can be positive whilst 
the test statistic is negative.  
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SMB factor are positive and significant, and on the HML and MOM factors the 
loadings are significantly negative. The adjacent two columns splits the sample period 
in two, but the loadings have similar values across the two sub-periods, with the 
exception of the momentum factor, whose loading coefficient changes sign. The 
Jensen-alpha over these two sub-periods is significantly negative. As in Table 6, for 
the conditional and unconditional models, when the timing term is added the 
selectivity coefficient is positive but the timing coefficient is negative.  Note, though, 
that in contrast to Table 6 selection is significantly positive and timing is significantly 
negative.  In the conditional model, the loading on HML becomes insignificant.  
However, including a timing variable reduces the explanatory power (adjusted R2) 
substantially. 
 
Table 8 reports the results of estimating performance of the personal pension funds by 
sector. It can be seen that the All UK Companies, Managed and Equity Income 
sectors have negative Jensen-alphas overall, although only the All companies sector is 
significantly negative.  Alphas are also negative in each of the two sub-period, with 
the Managed sector being significantly negative in the 1980-90 period only, whilst the 
All Companies and Equity Income sectors are significantly negative in the 1991-2000 
period. However the small firm sector has a significantly positive Jensen-alpha over 
the whole period, and it can be seen that this is explained by significant abnormal 
performance in the second sub-sample from 1991-2000, in spite of the fact that the 
first sub-period exhibited significantly negative performance. 
 
The remaining tables examine the issue of persistence in performance. That is, rather 
than solely be concerned with whether a scheme out-performs over a specified time-
period, we now assess whether a scheme fund that has out-performed in one period 
can repeat this feat in subsequent periods. Table 9 reports the results for abnormal 
returns obtained from the 4-factor model. It can be seen that at short-run intervals 
there is no evidence of persistence, and in fact there is significant evidence of 
abnormal return reversals for both the performance ranked portfolio strategies in 
Panel A, and the contingency tables in Panel B. However at medium-term time 
intervals of between 6 to 12 months there is strong evidence of persistence: TDIF for 
6MR6ME is significantly positive at 2.75. In Panel B focusing on the percentage of 
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repeat winners, it can be seen that at the one month horizon 47 per cent of winners 
(greater than the median) in any period repeat the feat in the following month. As the 
horizon increases up to 12 months the percentage of repeat winners increases to over 
53 per cent, before falling to 45 per cent at three year intervals. The other criteria 
(odds ratio, CHI test, and cross-sectional t-test confirm this pattern). Though the TDIF 
statistic in Panel A on the 36 month horizon, which according to Carpenter and Lynch 
(1999) is the preferred measure of persistence, documents weak evidence of 
persistence even at longer horizons.  
 
Tables 10 and 11 report the results of the persistency tests for the 3-factor and CAPM 
models of abnormal returns. It can be seen that the findings in Table 10 for the 3-
factor models are similar to those in Table 9: significant evidence of persistence in all 
tests at the 12 month horizon, with weaker positive persistence at longer horizons, and 
significant negative persistence at short horizons. In fact the measurement of 
persistence is similar to the values in Blake and Timmermann (1998) for general UK 
equity funds. They report that an equally-weighted risk adjusted winner-loser 
portfolio formed on the previous 24-month returns, yields a monthly return of 
0.091%, whereas from Table 10 Panel A our winner-loser portfolio based on past 12-
month returns (12MR12ME) yields a slightly larger monthly return of  0.153%.   The 
CAPM results in Table 11 are generally weaker, and there is generally less evidence 
of positive persistence. These results are surprising in light of the Fletcher and Forbes 
(2002) finding that including a momentum factor explains much of the persistence in 
mutual fund performance. In contrast the results in Tables 9 to 11 suggest that 
positive performance persistence increases as we move from a single factor through a 
three-factor to a four-factor benchmark which includes a momentum factor. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper has examined the performance of personal pensions (exempt unit 
trusts) in the UK over the period 1980-2000. These last twenty years have seen a 
rapid growth in the amount of savings devoted to personal pensions. The paper 
has assessed the performance of these pension funds relative to a variety of 
benchmarks: a single factor (CAPM) model, Fama-French’s 3-factor, and a four 
factor benchmark allowing for market timing and conditioning on macroeconomic 
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variables, and finds that average performance is not significantly different from 
zero. This finding is consistent with much of the previous literature, that on 
average managed funds do not earn abnormal returns. 
 
The paper went on to examine persistence in the performance of these pension 
schemes and for a 4-factor and 3-factor benchmarks identifies negative 
persistence at short horizons, but at time-intervals of six months to one year finds 
significant positive persistence, though this persistence weakens at longer time 
intervals.  
 
These results on significant positive persistence at 12-month horizons are consistent 
with some earlier work on the persistence of UK mutual funds, and indicates that 
contractual savings schemes are also associated with fund manager ability. Our 
findings on the performance persistence of united personal pensions are slightly 
stronger than the performance persistence in Blake and Timmermann (1998). They 
report that a risk a winner-loser portfolio yields an annual return of 1.1%, whereas our 
winner-loser portfolio based on past 12-month returns yields an annual return of  
1.8%.   It is surprising that the persistence in performance of personal pensions is 
greater than for more general unit trusts, and suggests that either pension fund 
providers devote more resources to managing personal pension funds than regular unit 
trusts; or consumers in contracting into a long-term personal pension scheme are 
concerned to examine the past performance of the pension fund provider.  
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Table 1: Employees Covered by Type of Pension in 1998 
Type of Pension Scheme Numbers of 
persons 
(Millions) 
Percentage of 
Working Population 
Covered 
Occupational Pensions 10.5 30 
Appropriate Personal Pensions 5.6 16 
Personal Pensions  
(Not Eligible for SERPS) 
4.6 13 
SERPS  7.1 20 
Source: Government Green Paper (Chap 2, paras. 15, 25, December 1998), and own calculations. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Number of UK Exempt Unit Trusts 1980-2000
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Table 3: Personal Pension Business Through Insurance Companies 
 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999
Panel A: Personal Pensions in Force 
 
 
No. of Policies (000s) 2,971 5,697 15,212 19,922 20,890
Premiums (£million) 669 1,614 4,212 5,441 7,010
Average Premium per policy (£) 225 283 276 273 335
Panel B: New Personal Pensions  
No. of New Policies (000s) 431 912 2,440 1,077 1,360
of which:  Single premium (000s) 745 230 294
                 Yearly (000s) 1,695 848 1,066
Premiums on New Single Policies (£m) 298 812 3,941 3,236 4,513
Premiums on New Yearly Policies (£m) 182 414 1,000 832 1,443
Average Premium per policy on New 
Single Policies (£) 
   5,289 14,070 15,350
Average Premium per policy on New 
Yearly Policies (£) 
589 981 1,353
Yearly,  means a regular savings scheme 
Source: ABI Insurance Statistics Yearbook 1983-93, Tables 78,79; 1987-97 & 1989-99 Tables 28, 29. 
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Table 4: Persistency Rates for Personal Pensions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Smith (2004) and FSA Persistency Tables. A personal pension is a long term savings contract with agreed contribution rates 
specified in the contract. The persistency rates show the percentage of personal pension schemes to which consumers continue to make 
contributions (persistency) one year, two years, three years and four years after starting the personal pension scheme 
 
 Regular premium policies sold by tied advisors Regular premium policies sold by IFAs 
 % of policies persisting after . . . % of policies persisting after . . . 
Start year 1 year 2-year 3-year 4-year 1 year 2-year 3-year 4-year 
         
1993 84.1 72.3 63.6 56.7 91.5 83.3 76.6 70.5 
1994 83.7 72.6 64.2 57.1 90.9 81.2 73.6 66.9 
1995 85.4 74.7 65.4 57.8 90.2 80.6 72.1 64.7 
1996 86.4 74.6 65.1 57.2 89.8 79.8 69.8 62.3 
1997 85.6 73.7 64.0 57.2 90.2 78.5 69.3 60.7 
1998 85.2 73.6 64.1 56.8 88.3 75.8 64.7 53.9 
1999 84.7 71.8 62.3  87.2 72.3 59.5  
2000 84.7 73.4   83.8 68.1   
2001 84.5    83.8    
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics on Exempt Unit Trust Personal Pension Schemes 
1980-2000 
Panel A: Returns Across Months and Schemes 
Returns All Weighted by 
smv 
>20 Months = 247 Months FT-All 
ShareRets
Mean 0.0111 0.0125 0.0112 0.0131 0.0149 
Std. Dev. 0.0457 0.0470 0.0456 0.0460 0.0473 
Between Std. Dev. 0.0097     
Within Std. Dev. 0.0595     
Distribution of returns: 
10% -0.0447 -0.0453 -0.0455 -0.0418  
25% -0.0118 -0.0101 -0.0116 -0.0089  
50% 0.0128 0.0148 0.0129 0.0156  
75% 0.0380 0.0400 0.0381 0.0410  
90% 0.0625 0.0645 0.0625 0.0649  
Obs. 55,879 55,205 54,876 4,940 247 
No. of schemes 506 506 399 20  
 
Panel B: Distribution of Scheme-Months 
No. of UK Sector Schemes 399 No. of Scheme-Months 54,876 
Distribution of Scheme-Months 
min 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% max 
20 25 75 152 191 247 247 
 
Panel C: Returns Across Months and Schemes by sector >20 Months 
Returns All Companies Managed Equity Income Small 
Mean 0.0116 0.0100 0.0115 0.0106 
Median 0.0134 0.0119 0.0130 0.0110 
Std. Dev. 0.0462 0.0412 0.0442 0.0552 
Obs. 35,635 10,575 5,922 2,744 
No. of schemes 254 78 45 22 
Before 31st Dec. 1990    
Mean 0.0128 0.0081 0.0122 0.0030 
Obs. 10,798 2,700 1,493 551 
No. of schemes 152 47 26 11 
After 31st Dec. 1990    
Mean 0.0111 0.0107 0.0114 0.0127 
Obs. 24,726 7,825 4,399 2,176 
No. of schemes 254 78 45 22 
 
Panel D: Distribution of Fund Size Across Funds 
 # 
Obs. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
Size at end of Dec. 
2000 (£ million) 
495 106.55 297.21 0.53 2.15 8.09 46.60 220.50 
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Table 6 Performance Evaluation: selectivity and market timing with alternative factor benchmarks 
 No. Funds α α t-stat η η t-stat R2 
       
Average Coeffs. single factor 399 -0.00013 -6.43   0.743 
Average Coeffs. single factor with 
market timing 
399 0.00033 -1.07 -0.1538 -14.12 0.750 
Average Coeffs. Cond. Single factor 
with market timing 
399 0.00047 -0.79 -0.0745 -6.68 0.771 
Average Coeffs. 3-factor 399 0.00029 -1.68   0.808 
Average Coeffs. 3-factor with market 
timing 
399 0.00030 0.68 0.1081 -7.75 0.814 
Average Coeffs. Cond. 3-factor with 
market timing 
399 0.00040 0.47 0.2306 -1.06 0.830 
Average Coeffs. 4-factor  399 0.00016 -2.45   0.814 
Average Coeffs. 4-factor with market 
timing 
399 0.00027 0.59 0.0474 -8.10 0.819 
Average Coeffs. Cond. 4-factor with 
market timing 
399 0.0004 0.41 0.1654 -1.34 0.835 
       
For each scheme we regress the respective factor model and obtain the scheme’s Jensen-alphas. For the four factor model the regression 
equation is (1):  Rpt - rft =  αp + βp (Rmt - rft) +  γp SMBt + δp HMLt + λp MOMt +  εpt. For the single factor model γp = δp = λp = 0; and for the 3-
factor model λp = 0.    In the α-column of the table we report the average Jensen-alpha estimates from these regressions, and the relevant 
overall t-statistic for the average value of each parameter, computed as in equation (3).  The average market timing parameter from the Treynor 
regression in equation (4) and from the conditional model in equation (5) are reported in the η-column with its relevant t-statistic in the adjacent 
column. The final column reports the average R2 for the regressions. All t-statistics are based on robust standard errors. 
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Table 7: Performance Evaluation of equally-weighted portfolio with 4-factor model over time 
 Full sample 
period  
Sample period 
1980-90 
Sample period 1991-
2000 
Full sample period 
with market 
timing 
Full sample 
period with 
Condit. model 
Jensen-alpha -0.00003 -0.00038** 0.00010** 0.00065** 0.00062** 
 (-0.68) (-4.24) (-2.77) (5.78) (5.30) 
RALL 0.8795** 0.8343** 0.9129** 0.8698** 0.8856** 
 (1064.96) (589.17) (943.68) (371.83) (338.42) 
SMB 0.2317** 0.3741** 0.2010** 0.2269** 0.2380** 
 (172.78) (102.36) (156.82) (62.24) (64.21) 
HML -0.0117** -0.0500** -0.0284** -0.0125** -0.0011 
 (-8.53) (-12.29) (-21.51) (-3.37) (-0.29) 
MOM -0.0073** 0.1547** -0.0294** -0.0142** -0.0101** 
 (-4.88) (32.73) (-20.56) (-3.46) (-2.45) 
RALL2    -0.3038** -0.2143** 
    (-13.96) (-6.21) 
R2 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.741 0.744 
We regress the 4-factor model Rpt - rft =  αp + βp (Rmt - rft) +  γp SMBt + δp HMLt + λp MOMt +  εpt, where the dependent variable is the 
equally-weighted excess return on an equally weighted portfolio p of funds at time t and we report the coefficients on the factors from these 
regressions. The market timing coefficient on Rall2 from the Treynor regression in equation (4) and from the conditional model in equation 
(5) are also reported.  Relevant t-statistics are reported underneath each parameter estimate.  
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Table 8: Performance Evaluation of equally-weighted portfolio by sector over time 
 All companies Managed Equity Income Small 
All time periods     
Jensen-alpha -0.00021** -0.00014 -0.00007 0.0028** 
t-stat (-4.66) (-1.00) (-0.49) (7.04) 
# Obs 35,635 10,575 5,922 2,744 
R2 0.961 0.856 0.929 0.839 
Sample period 1980-
90 
    
Jensen-alpha -0.00009 -0.00137** -0.00005 -0.00342** 
t-stat. (-0.96) (-3.66) (-0.12) (-3.71) 
# Obs 10,798 2,700 1,493 551 
R2 0.967 0.849 0.935 0.89 
Sample period 1991-
2000 
    
Jensen-alpha -0.00042** -0.00009 -0.00034** 0.00423** 
t-stat. (-9.34) (-0.64) (-2.27) (9.39) 
# Obs 24,726 7,825 4,399 2,176 
R2 0.965 0.878 0.933 0.824 
As in table 7, but for each scheme sector we regress the 4-factor model Rpt - rft =  αp + βp (Rmt - rft) +  γp SMBt + δp HMLt + λp MOMt +  εpt, 
where the dependent variable is the equally-weighted excess return on an equally weighted portfolio p of funds in that sector at time t. We 
report the Jensen-alpha for each sector and the relevant t-statistics are given underneath the parameter estimates.  
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Table 9: Persistence Tests based on 4-factor Abnormal Returns of Pension Scheme Performance 
Panel A. Performance ranked portfolio tests of scheme performance   
 # periods AV5 AV1 DIF TDIF 
1MR1ME 246 -0.00259 0.00348 -0.00607 -5.93 
3MR3ME 242 0.00021 0.00035 -0.00014 -0.21 
6MR6ME 236 0.00090 -0.00062 0.00152 2.75 
12MR12ME 224 0.00109 -0.00059 0.00162 2.62 
36MR36ME 176 -0.00009 -0.00074 0.00066 1.64 
For performance ranked tests, pension schemes are sorted each year into quintile portfolios based on 
past performance of the pension schemes - abnormal returns of each scheme over the ranking period. 
The equally weighted average portfolio abnormal returns of the top and bottom portfolios over the 
subsequent evaluation period is computed; AV5 and AV1 are the abnormal returns of the top and 
bottom portfolios in the evaluation period, averaged over all time periods in the sample. There are five 
different ranking and evaluation periods: 36MR36ME means three-year (36 months) ranking period 
and three year evaluation period, and 1MR1ME means a one month ranking period and one month 
evaluation period. This procedure is followed for overlapping periods throughout the full period of the 
dataset, and DIF is AV5-AV1, and  TDIF is a t-statistic on DIF, allowing for the autocorrelation 
induced by using overlapping observations. 
 
Panel B: Contingency tables of scheme performance 
 N PRW CP Z-stat CHI TCS 
1MR1ME 54,477 0.4704 0.7745 -14.879 222.23 -33.24 
3MR3ME 17,189 0.5097 1.0631 2.005 4.176 1.22 
6MR6ME 8,517 0.5325 1.2667 5.446 29.877 6.16 
12MR12ME 3,737 0.5373 1.3401 4.462 19.967 9.17 
36MR36ME 719 0.4562 0.7870 -1.606 3.186 -1.13 
Schemes are classified as winners or losers based on abnormal returns in each of two consecutive time 
periods, and the numbers of winner-winner (WW), winner-loser (WL), loser winner (LW) and loser-
loser (LL) are counted. The following statistics are computed: a) Percentage of repeat winners, PRW = 
WW/(N/2); b) Cross-product ratio CP = (WW x LL)/(WL x LW); where  log(CP)/σlog(CP)  has a 
standard normal distribution, and  σlog(CP) = √[(1/WW) + (1/WL) + (1/LW) + (1/LL)]; c) Chi-Squared 
test with 1 d.o.f. where CHI = {(WW - N/4)2 + (WL - N/4)2  + (LW - N/4)2 (LL - N/4)2}/N/4, and N is 
the number of pairs; and d) TCS is the t-statistic for the slope coefficient in the pooled cross-section 
OLS regression of evaluation period abnormal returns on ranking period abnormal returns.  
 
  
 28
Table 10: Persistence Tests based on 3-factor Abnormal Returns of Pension Scheme 
Performance 
Panel A. Performance ranked portfolio tests of scheme performance   
 # periods AV5 AV1 DIF TDIF 
1MR1ME 246 -0.00139 0.00160 -0.00299 -2.35 
3MR3ME 242 0.00013 0.00045 -0.00031 -0.47 
6MR6ME 236 0.00083 -0.00047 0.00130 2.39 
12MR12ME 224 0.00108 -0.00046 0.00153 2.42 
36MR36ME 176 -0.00006 -0.00070 0.00064 1.52 
For performance ranked tests, pension schemes are sorted each year into quintile portfolios based on 
past performance of the pension schemes - abnormal returns of each scheme over the ranking period. 
The equally weighted average portfolio abnormal returns of the top and bottom portfolios over the 
subsequent evaluation period is computed; AV5 and AV1 are the abnormal returns of the top and 
bottom portfolios in the evaluation period, averaged over all time periods in the sample. There are four 
different ranking and evaluation periods: 36MR36ME means three-year ranking period and three year 
evaluation period, and 1MR1ME means a one month ranking period and one month evaluation period. 
This procedure is followed for overlapping periods throughout the full period of the dataset, and DIF is 
AV5-AV1, and  TDIF is a t-statistic on DIF, allowing for the autocorrelation induced by using 
overlapping observations. 
 
Panel B: Contingency tables of scheme performance 
 N PRW CP Z-stat CHI TCS 
1MR1ME 54,477 0.4692 0.7678 -15.384 237.531 -33.32 
3MR3ME 17,189 0.5074 1.0411 1.3188 1.939 -2.97 
6MR6ME 8,517 0.5278 1.2153 4.4941 20.461 4.63 
12MR12ME 3,737 0.5277 1.2429 3.3193 11.056 9.26 
36MR36ME 719 0.4506 0.7359 -2.0488 4.611 -1.14 
Schemes are classified as winners or losers based on abnormal returns in each of two consecutive time 
periods, and the numbers of winner-winner (WW), winner-loser (WL), loser winner (LW) and loser-
loser (LL) are counted. The following statistics are computed: a) Percentage of repeat winners, PRW = 
WW/(N/2); b) Cross-product ratio CP = (WW x LL)/(WL x LW); where  log(CP)/σlog(CP)  has a 
standard normal distribution, and  σlog(CP) = √[(1/WW) + (1/WL) + (1/LW) + (1/LL)]; c) Chi-Squared 
test with 1 d.o.f. where CHI = {(WW - N/4)2 + (WL - N/4)2  + (LW - N/4)2 (LL - N/4)2}/N/4, and N is 
the number of pairs; and d) TCS is the t-statistic for the slope coefficient in the pooled cross-section 
OLS regression of evaluation period abnormal returns on ranking period abnormal returns. 
 
  
 29
Table 11: Persistence Tests based on single  factor (CAPM) Abnormal Returns of Pension 
Scheme Performance 
Panel A. Performance ranked portfolio tests of scheme performance   
 # periods AV5 AV1 DIF TDIF 
1MR1ME 246 -0.00139 0.00160 0.01994 -2.35 
3MR3ME 242 -0.00013 -0.00018 0.00005 0.04 
6MR6ME 236 0.00068 -0.00087 0.00156 1.73 
12MR12ME 224 0.00059 -0.00070 0.00129 1.49 
36MR36ME 176 0.00112 -0.00130 0.00018 0.27 
For performance ranked tests, pension schemes are sorted each year into quintile portfolios based on 
past performance of the pension schemes - abnormal returns of each scheme over the ranking period. 
The equally weighted average portfolio abnormal returns of the top and bottom portfolios over the 
subsequent evaluation period is computed; AV5 and AV1 are the abnormal returns of the top and 
bottom portfolios in the evaluation period, averaged over all time periods in the sample. There are four 
different ranking and evaluation periods: 36MR36ME means three-year ranking period and three year 
evaluation period, and 1MR1ME means a one month ranking period and one month evaluation period. 
This procedure is followed for overlapping periods throughout the full period of the dataset, and DIF is 
AV5-AV1, and  TDIF is a t-statistic on DIF, allowing for the autocorrelation induced by using 
overlapping observations. 
 
Panel B: Contingency tables of scheme performance 
 N PRW CP Z-stat CHI TCS 
1MR1ME 54,477 0.4898 0.9059 -5.763 33.704 -5.76 
3MR3ME 17,189 0.5019 0.9984 -0.054 0.1621 -5.49 
6MR6ME 8,517 0.4995 0.9818 -0.523 0.2352 -2.74 
12MR12ME 3,737 0.4993 1.0033 0.050 0.1014 0.22 
36MR36ME 719 0.4617 0.0848 -1.453 2.5188 -4.29 
Schemes are classified as winners or losers based on abnormal returns in each of two consecutive time 
periods, and the numbers of winner-winner (WW), winner-loser (WL), loser winner (LW) and loser-
loser (LL) are counted. The following statistics are computed: a) Percentage of repeat winners, PRW = 
WW/(N/2); b) Cross-product ratio CP = (WW x LL)/(WL x LW); where  log(CP)/σlog(CP)  has a 
standard normal distribution, and  σlog(CP) = √[(1/WW) + (1/WL) + (1/LW) + (1/LL)]; c) Chi-Squared 
test with 1 d.o.f. where CHI = {(WW - N/4)2 + (WL - N/4)2  + (LW - N/4)2 (LL - N/4)2}/N/4, and N is 
the number of pairs; and d) TCS is the t-statistic for the slope coefficient in the pooled cross-section 
OLS regression of evaluation period abnormal returns on ranking period abnormal returns.  
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